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The Critical Juncture Concept’s Evolving Capacity to
Explain Policy Change
John Hogan
This article examines the evolution of our understanding of the critical junctures concept. The con-
cept finds its origins in historical intuitionalism, being employed in the context of path dependence
to account for sudden and jarring institutional or policy changes. We argue that the concept and
the literature surrounding it—now incorporating ideas, discourse, and agency—have gradually
become more comprehensive and nuanced as historical institutionalism was followed by ideational
historical institutionalism and constructivist and discursive institutionalism. The prime position of
contingency has been supplanted by the role of ideas and agency in explaining critical junctures
and other instances of less than transformative change. Consequently, the concept is now capable of
providing more comprehensive explanations for policy change.
KEY WORDS: Critical juncture, contingency, path dependence, ideas, policy
以不断演变的关键时刻概念解释政策变化
本文考察了对关键时刻概念的理解所发生的演变。此概念起源于历史制度主义, 在路径依赖的
背景下得以应用, 用于解释突发和不符合制度的变化或政策变化。笔者主张, 围绕此概念的相
关概念和文献 (现包括观念, 话语和政府机构) 逐渐变得日益全面和复杂, 因为历史制度主义已
延伸到观念历史制度主义 (ideational historical institutionalism) 和建构话语制度主义 (construc-
tivist and discursive institutionalism)。 偶发性所占的重要位置已被观念和政府机构所扮演的角
色所取代, 用于解释关键时刻和其他略低于重大变化的时刻。结果则是, 关键时刻概念现能为
政策变化提供更多全面性的解释。
关键词: 关键时刻, 偶发性, 路径依赖, 观点, 政策
La capacidad evolutiva del concepto de coyuntura crıtica para explicar el
cambio de polıtica
Este artıculo examina la evolucion de nuestra comprension del concepto de coyunturas crıticas. El
concepto encuentra sus orıgenes en el institucionalismo historico, siendo empleado en el contexto de
la dependencia de la trayectoria para explicar cambios institucionales o polıticos repentinos y discor-
dantes. Argumentamos que el concepto y la literatura que lo rodea, que ahora incorpora ideas, dis-
curso y agencia, se ha ido haciendo cada vez mas comprensivo y matizado a medida que el
institucionalismo historico fue seguido por el institucionalismo historico ideacional y el instituciona-
lismo constructivista y discursivo. La posicion principal de la contingencia ha sido suplantada por el
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papel de las ideas y la agencia en la explicacion de las coyunturas crıticas y otras instancias de cam-
bios menos transformadores. En consecuencia, el concepto ahora es capaz de proporcionar explicacio-
nes mas completas para el cambio de polıticas.
PALABRAS CLAVES: coyuntura crıtica, contingencia, dependencia de la trayectoria, ideas, polıtica
Introduction
New institutionalism, and historical institutionalism in particular, has tradi-
tionally regarded the decisions made when an institution is formed, or policy ini-
tiated, as possessing a persistent influence. In the context of historical
institutionalism, institutions are seen to encompass public policies (Capoccia,
2015; Peters, 2012). Explaining policy continuity has been historical institutional-
ism’s strength. It has tended to focus on the macro processes of path dependency,
“lock-in,” and the inefficient histories that constrain possible futures (March &
Olsen, 1984; Pierson, 2000). Traditionally, with path dependence, the costs of
reversing a policy path become increasingly high (Pierson, 2000). According to
Rayner (2015), narrative accounts of path dependency are almost always sub-
sumed under the larger rubric of the constraints imposed by the original path and
the various positive feedback mechanisms that lock in actors. Policies, once initi-
ated, would continue until a sufficiently strong force deflects them (Krasner, 1984,
p. 240).
In these circumstances, institutional explanations for radical change have tra-
ditionally looked to exogenous factors. The results see history divided into long
periods of stasis and brief instances of transformation. One of the concepts histori-
cal institutionalism has relied upon to explain such change is that of critical junc-
tures (Mahoney, 2001). Critical juncture frameworks have evolved over time to
differentiate between radical changes and other forms of transformation—driven
both by exogenous and endogenous forces. This paper seeks to show how the
concept was initially employed by historical institutionalists in thin ways that
enabled them to avoid dealing with change during the juncture and has gradually
developed over time into a thicker concept. This was not only because historical
institutionalists acknowledged the need for a deeper conceptualization, but also
because constructivist and discursive institutionalists brought ideas, discourse,
and agency into the critical junctures concept. In this manner, the concept is pro-
viding new insights into policy change.
The first section examines the critical junctures concept’s origins in historical
institutionalism. We then look at the early frameworks developed to examine criti-
cal junctures, along with their insights, strengths, and limitations. Then, we exam-
ine the later conceptualizations of critical junctures, when interests, ideas,
discourse, and agency acquired increasing significance. This leads to our example,
showing what the earlier and later conceptualizations of critical junctures can tell
us about policy change.
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Critical Junctures and Historical Institutionalism
The advent of new institutionalism, ushered in by March and Olsen (1984),
points to the importance of temporality. Neo-institutionalism focuses on rela-
tionships between institutions and the actors active within them. Institutions
constitute the formal/informal context that structures human behavior. New
institutionalism quickly divided into three main schools, with the fourth, con-
structivist/discursive institutionalism, coming later. Of the three initial schools—
rational choice, sociological, and historical institutionalism—historical is of partic-
ular interest.
Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 2) define historical institutionalism as represent-
ing an attempt to illuminate how political struggles are mediated by their context.
Early in its development, historical institutionalism included ideas, agents, institu-
tions, and rules, but over time, it moved toward a more parsimonious approach
(see Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). “Historical institutionalism has followed March and
Olsen’s (1984) suggestion about de-emphasizing micro processes and focused on
explaining complex processes and inefficient histories” (Rayner, 2015, p. 55). It
argues that early choices have a persistent influence (Peters, 2012). The result has
been that historical institutionalists focus on the process of path dependence, and
lock-in, that narrows future options (Pierson, 2000). Questions of evolution and
change initially attracted little attention (Thelen, 2004, p. 24). This has meant the
reduction in agency for the sake of reducing outcomes to the logic of path
dependency.
Path dependence seems to encourage scholars to think of institutional change
as either minor and continuous or major and abrupt (Streeck & Thelen, 2005).
Thus, periods of institutional genesis are seen as corresponding to critical junc-
tures (Abbott, 1997). This formative capacity of critical junctures is part of what
made the concept intriguing. The junctures are critical as they place institutional
arrangements on trajectories difficult to alter (Pierson, 2004, 135).
Critical junctures, caused by exogenous shocks, were relied upon to explain
sudden punctuations to extant policy equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993;
Krasner, 1984). The concept offered a framework for examining those rare
moments of political openness in the evolution of an institution when new and
enduring legacies can be formed (Capoccia, 2015). However, while path depen-
dence brought the concept of critical junctures to wider attention, it impeded theo-
rizing associated with it. Exogenous shocks removed the need to theorize about
endogenous drivers of critical junctures and impeded recognition that the concept
needed to be able to account for a spectrum of change.
“The assumption that institutional structures persist unless there are external
shocks, underestimates both intra- and inter-institutional dynamics and sources of
change” (March & Olsen, 2005, p. 15). Most crises are followed either by policy
continuity or by incremental change, not critical junctures. However, subtly and
nuance in our understanding of the critical junctures concept were initially
lacking.
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The Early Critical Junctures Literature—Path Dependence
From the emergence of historical institutionalism, critical junctures have been
employed in providing explanations for change. This was particularly relevant in
the context of path-dependent institutions, where continuity was understandable,
but change was difficult to explain. The initial critical junctures frameworks were
basic. As the concept was insufficiently specified, it was used as a catchall to
explain change without sufficient justification. “Many of the key concepts needed
to underpin analyses of temporal processes, such as path dependency, critical
junctures, sequencing, events, duration, timing, and unintended consequences,
have received only fragmented and limited discussion” (Pierson, 2004, pp. 5–6).
Not all events, even seemingly significant events, can reasonably be called
critical junctures. A critical juncture must be an event, prior to which a range of
possibilities exist, but after which these possibilities will have mostly vanished. It
is at the narrowing point, where possibilities close that we seek a means of defin-
ing critical junctures. “Hence, not all choice points represent critical junctures;
only those choice points that close off important future outcomes should be trea-
ted as critical junctures” (Mahoney, 2001, p. 112).
Mahoney’s (2001) definition of path dependence sought to separate critical
junctures of institutional formation from long periods of stability. Critical junc-
tures establish pathways that funnel units in particular directions. Once units
begin to move in a direction, they realize increasing returns and become locked in
(Howlett, 2009; Mahoney, 2003; Pierson, 2000). This is akin to Baumgartner and
Jones’s (1993) concept of punctuated equilibrium. A critical juncture points to the
importance of the past in explaining the present and highlights the need for a
broad historical vantage point. Moreover, this necessarily “suggests the impor-
tance of focusing on the formative moments for institutions and organisations”
(Pierson, 1993, p. 602). But, the problem has been the depth and understanding to
which those formative moments have been examined.
One of the earliest uses of the critical junctures concept was by Lipset and
Rokkan (1967, p. 48), where they located the beginning of the political party sys-
tems in Western Europe in three earlier critical junctures, the Reformation, then
national and industrial revolutions. Early examples of the use of the critical junc-
tures concept in historical institutionalism, embedded in antecedent conditions
and path dependence, leave little room for discretion. This is because antecedent
conditions “define the range of alternatives available to decision makers” (Maho-
ney, 2001, pp. 6–7). As such, agents do not have free choice per se; they do not
begin with a blank slate. There was also the complication that the duration of a
critical juncture could involve a relatively brief period in which one direction or
another is taken or an extended period of reorientation (Mahoney, 2001). By
extended period, we mean that the critical juncture could last for decades but
with a shorter legacy.
The analyses also seemed to vary between the underlying societal cleavages,
or crises, that precipitated critical junctures, or concentrated primarily on the criti-
cal junctures themselves, while overlooking the processes occurring during the
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critical juncture. Nevertheless, central to these approaches is an understanding
that change is a cornerstone of comparative historical research and development,
that historical institutionalism is incapable of explaining change (a violation of
theoretical parsimony (Rayner, 2015), and that the critical junctures concept pro-
vides this opportunity.
Collier and Collier (1991) developed a framework for analyzing critical junc-
tures in the trajectories of national development in Latin America. “The literature
on critical junctures views them from the perspective of crises, placing particular
emphasis on the tensions leading up to the critical juncture” (Collier & Collier,
1991, p. 32). Antecedent conditions are identified as important—making the con-
cept historical institutionalist in nature. Collier and Collier (1991, p. 29) define a
critical juncture “as a period of significant change, which typically occurs in dis-
tinct ways in different countries and which is hypothesized to produce distinct
legacies.” Although their definition does not imply the primacy of agency over
structure, its openness to longer term institutional innovation means that it does
not provide a framework for determining at what point change is sufficient to
constitute a critical juncture (Hogan, 2006). They regard the incorporation period
in Peru, 23 years, as a critical juncture—when it looks like incremental change.
This is at odds with Capoccia’s (2015, p. 2) perspective, as he sees critical junc-
tures as “shorter phases of fluidity and change alternating with longer periods of
stability and adoption.”
Mahoney’s (2000, p. 535) conceptualization of critical junctures argued that
the contingent period corresponded to the adoption of an initial institutional
arrangement. He tries to explain why the liberal period in the 19th century, in five
Central American countries, constituted critical junctures resulting in regime dif-
ferences in the following century. For Mahoney (2001), while antecedent condi-
tions were important, the decisions of those in charge were crucial, highlighting
agency. However, as with Collier and Collier (1991), critical junctures are seen as
having taken decades, while their aftereffects are often shorter. This raises ques-
tions about those periods of change, and whether they were in fact critical junc-
tures. “To be able to recognize what is a critical juncture, we must be able to
recognize what is not” (Hogan, 2006, p. 664). In response, Hogan (2006) intro-
duced the notion that change in a critical juncture must be significant, swift, and
enduring, wherein operational definitions would be dependent upon the research-
er’s understanding of the topic.
Garrett and Lange (1995, p. 628) argued that electoral landslides create critical
junctures by producing overwhelming mandates for change. They looked at pol-
icy changes toward the trade union movement by the Conservative government
under Thatcher in the United Kingdom (UK) in the early 1980s. Casper and
Taylor (1996) argued that critical junctures can be used in analyzing periods when
authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to liberalization. For them, a critical juncture
(anything from a strike to a war) is a signal to potential challengers to indicate
that the regime has weakened and an opportunity exists for a new political sys-
tem. Examining the watershed in American trade policy that was the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Haggard (1988, p. 91) argues that unanticipated
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events (critical junctures), in this case an economic depression, brings into ques-
tion existing institutions and results in dramatic change.
Karl (1997) referred to multiple critical junctures in her analysis of how
“petro-states” became locked into problematic development paths. She examined
a range of countries for whom the discovery of oil led to instability. Gal and
Bargal (2002) analyzed the emergence of occupational welfare in Israel using criti-
cal junctures. They argued that how the state was created, along with the collu-
sion of competing interests in the labor movement, led to flat rate pension
benefits. Vargas (2004) used critical junctures to examine the conflict in Chiapas,
Mexico.
The Limitations of the Early Critical Junctures Concept
These understandings did not specify criteria with which to assess potential
critical junctures to discover if they were critical junctures or changes of a differ-
ent nature. Only early contingent events in the sequence matter as the subsequent
events possess inertia (Howlett, 2009; Mahoney, 2000). Clearly, earlier events gave
rise to path dependence and policies that persisted (Capoccia, 2015). The frame-
works created to examine critical junctures tended toward understanding policy
development as bipolar—either stable or undergoing periodic radical changes
brought about by exogenous shocks (Boas, 2007; Howlett, 2009; Thelen, 2004). If
critical junctures are of such importance, as their name suggests, then there was
room for improvement. As we shall see, the improvements that came, varied and
exciting, have resulted in the concept and its frameworks developing subtlety and
sensitivity to various types of change through an appreciation of agency, interests,
discourses, and ideas. That development is not only because historical institution-
alists have acknowledged the need for deeper conceptualization, but also because
constructivist and discursive institutionalists have come to employ critical
junctures.
The Deepening of the Critical Junctures Concept
Since before the turn of the century, we have seen gradual evolution in the
concept of critical junctures and a more encompassing understanding of institu-
tions to include policies. These developments were initially driven by historical
institutionalists with an interest in ideas and policies such as Weir (1992); Hall
(1993) and Blyth (1997). I refer to them as historical institutionalists, as when they
were writing and pioneering an explanatory role for ideas in new institutionalism,
there was very little reference to ideational, constructivist, or discursive institu-
tionalism (Hay, 2006). Cox (2001, p. 471) advocated using the constructivist per-
spective to expand the path dependence approach, as this specifies the path-
shaping power of ideas, and individual action, to alter institutional configurations.
Although she had previously alluded to it, Schmidt (2002) first used the term dis-
cursive institutionalism for the range of scholars using ideas and the interactions
of discourse in an institutional context to explain change that may be either
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evolutionary or revolutionary. The implication is that incremental change and crit-
ical junctures can be in play simultaneously.
“Discursive institutionalism lends insight into the role of ideas and discourse
in politics while providing a more dynamic approach to institutional change than
the older three new institutionalisms” (Schmidt, 2008, p. 303). Discursive institu-
tionalism’s emergence marks the turn to ideas in political science (Ladi, 2011). In
this context, institutions are contingent upon the involvement of actors (Peters,
2012, p. 124). From this perspective, to understand policy change, we have to
understand the context in which agents think, speak, and act. Discourse contains
not only ideas about policies but also the interactive process by which ideas are
spread, and the context in which they are developed and promoted (Schmidt,
2008). For Schmidt (2008, p. 303), discourse “comes in two forms: the coordinative
discourse among policy actors and the communicative discourse between political
actors and the public.” Coordinative discourse involves individuals and groups at
the center of policy construction, those involved in the creation, elaboration, and
justification of policy ideas, while communicative discourse involves individuals
and groups active in the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political
ideas to the public (Schmidt, 2008). In both types of discourse, the role of the
agent is central and as a result, to be able to explain change, special attention
needs to be paid to the agents and their interests (Ladi, 2011). Discourse links
structure to agency.
“Discursive institutionslism is expected to shed light on the agency during
those critical junctures through the study of ideas and discourse” (Ladi, 2011,
p. 208). This approach will permit us to understand why all exogenous shocks do
not cause the same kinds of contingent and enduring changes. However, for his-
torical institutionalists, “critical moments are unexplainable times when structures
shift, for discursive institutionalists these moments are the objects of explanation
through ideas and discourse, which lend insight into how the historically trans-
mitted, path-dependent structures are reconstructed” (Schmidt, 2008, p. 316). We
will see that, during a crisis, various types of agents increase their actives, acting
as carries of ideas and drivers of policy change as they engage in the coordinative
and communicative discourse (Schmidt, 2008, 2010). In the context of critical junc-
tures, agency ultimately concerns the choice of a specific policy option. The result
is a critical junctures concept that has become capable of accounting for different
types of change, identifying endogenous sources of change, and not just relying
upon exogenous ones.
The Later Critical Junctures Literature
Constructivist and Discursive Institutionalism
Over time, historical and discursive institutionalist researchers have sought to
develop better understandings of how critical junctures occur, what defines them,
how to differentiate them from other forms of change, and how to theorize a criti-
cal juncture. While answering these questions may place restrictions on the liberty
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with which the term can be employed, we will be able to say with greater cer-
tainty what a critical juncture is.
The early frameworks generally lacked rigor—failing to offer a set of criteria
with which to assess potential critical junctures. While acknowledging that devel-
oping a set of universally applicable standards would be impossible, moving in
that direction would constitute an advance. These approaches seek to address the
infinite regress problem, the agency problem, generative cleavage, contingency,
and critical juncture duration. A clearer understanding of critical junctures would
provide us with a break in the chain of causation with which to define the start-
ing point for analysis.
Policies can be discredited due to their implication in, or inability to resolve, a
crisis. When a policy is in difficulty, windows of opportunity appear, wherein
change agents contest the viability of the prevailing paradigm (Kingdon, 1995). As
early as 1992, Weir (188) sought to explore “when and how politics and ideas
combine to produce policy innovation and why some ideas fail to influence pol-
icy.” Hall (1993, p. 279) pointed out that ideas determine the path of subsequent
policy, as policy-makers work within a framework of ideas and standards that
specify not only the goals of policy but also the instruments to be used to achieve
these goals. “Ideas facilitate the reduction of . . . barriers by acting as coalition-
building resources among agents who attempt to resolve the crisis” (Blyth, 2002,
p. 37). This is an ideational phase where “agents interested in reforming existing
distributional arrangements contest the definition, meaning and solution to the
problems identified by opposing ideologies” (Blyth, 1997, p. 234). That said, Hall
(1993) has been criticized for an oversimplified critical juncture type change, see-
ing ideas as too static with a diminished role for actor agency (Matthijs, 2012;
Wilder & Howlett, 2014).
Golob (2003, p. 37) remarked on the increasing importance of ideas for critical
junctures when she said “ideas are the casual mechanisms of change in any criti-
cal juncture.” Thus, ideas found their way into the critical junctures concept
within a decade of Hall’s work on paradigms shifts. In 2005, Flockhart used criti-
cal junctures to explain the gap between Danish voters and their politician’s atti-
tudes toward the European Union (EU). She did this through the application of a
social constructivist perspective on ideational change with theories of social learn-
ing and identity. For her, “ideational change usually happens as a rational reac-
tion in response to external stimuli in the form of a destabilizing shock”
(Flockhart, 2005, p. 262).
Hogan and Doyle (2007), following Flockhart’s (2005) lead, employ interests,
ideas, and agency to understand critical junctures, wherein variation results from
choices and discourses. They argued that after an exogenous shock, ideational
change, involving change agents and their interests, is crucial for radical policy
change. They placed policy and political entrepreneurs, their interests and ideas,
and their ability to assemble coalitions for policy change, at the heart of their
framework, while drawing on Legro’s (2000) work on ideational change. In this
context, the presence of a crisis does not suggest a group of rivals is ready to
implement a paradigmatic shift (Baumgartner, 2012, p. 15). But, once a new idea
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is adopted “policymaking becomes possible only in terms of these ideas” (Blyth,
2001, p. 4). The attention to entrepreneurial agency, and discourse, is an effort to
“endogenize” policy change, diminishing exogenous shocks.
On examining the development of an EU counterterrorism policy through crit-
ical junctures, Wolff (2012) acknowledges that both exogenous and endogenous
events and choices by actors can cause critical junctures and that not all shocks
result in critical junctures. Interestingly, she suggests that a critical juncture does
not always equate with change, since external events might constrain actors. This
is akin to Capoccia’s (2015) notion of the near-miss critical juncture. Drawing on
Lindblom (1959), Wolff (2012) points out that most policy change is incremental.
Investigating the distinctiveness of critical junctures, Soifer (2012) focuses on
“permissive conditions”—that create, in the words of Capoccia and Kelemen
(2007), substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the out-
come of interest. These permissive conditions represent the easing of constraints
making change possible. A critical juncture “is marked by the emergence and dis-
appearance of permissive conditions” (Soifer, 2012, p. 1573). Permissive conditions
bound the productive conditions that result in critical junctures. Productive condi-
tions such as agency, ideational change, or contingency will shape the outcome of
the critical juncture (Capoccia, 2015). Borrowing from Slater and Simmons (2010),
Soifer (2012) points to the role of critical antecedents. These newer understandings
of critical junctures do not rely on “purely contingent initial conditions to set tra-
jectories in motion” (Howlett, 2009, p. 250).
According to Matthijs (2012), an economic crisis will result in a critical junc-
ture when it opens the door to new ideas that can function as a blueprint for new
institutions. This search for new ideas often leads to previously used ideas, which
are adapted to address current problems by policy entrepreneurs acting as bri-
coleurs (Carstensen, 2011, 2015). In this way, ideas provide the basic conditions
for successful collective action among actors interested in reforming distributional
relationships (Blyth, 1997). To define a crisis, Matthijs (2012) draws on Legro
(2000) and particularly on Blyth’s (2002) ideational and discourse work looking
for collapse of the extant orthodoxy. Matthijs (2012, p. 30) contends that “in the
absence of a crisis, ideas will at most bring about incremental change.”
Through applying critical junctures to the historical trajectories of institution
building in East Asia, Yoshimatsu (2014) argues that contingent crises have had
significant influence on institutions. During a crisis, actors undertake complex
learning, leading to improved ideas that increase the legitimacy and acceptance of
particular policies. “A critical juncture is regarded as creating the crucial
conditions that encourage states to adopt a new policy for regional cooperation”
(Yoshimatsu, 2014, p. 28).
Historical Institutionalism
These developments among scholars close to constructivist and discursive
institutionalism have been followed by advances among scholars who remain
more rationalist/historical institutionalist in approach. Similar to Hogan (2006),
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Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) argued that critical junctures should be “relatively
short periods during which there is a substantially heightened probability that
agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest.” They wanted to move away
from conflating critical junctures and gradual evolution. The duration of the criti-
cal juncture also had to be brief compared to the process it initiated. “In this ana-
lytical context, critical junctures are cast as moments in which uncertainty as to
the future of an institutional arrangement allows for political agency and choice
to play a decisive causal role” (Capoccia, 2015, p. 148). Capoccia (2015) also intro-
duced ideas into his discussion of critical junctures.
To address infinite regress associated with causation in path dependence,
Slater and Simmons (2010) developed a revised critical junctures framework to
identify the main casual factors in political development. They focused on antece-
dent conditions that caused the critical juncture, while not denying contingency
and agency (Capoccia, 2015). For Slater and Simmons (2010), critical antecedents
are “factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine in a causal
sequence with factors operating during that juncture to produce a divergent out-
come” (Slater & Simmons, 2010, p. 889). Divergence is something Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012) talked about in terms of minor institutional differences between
England, France, and Spain at the start of the early modern period that led to dif-
ferent development paths. For Slater and Simmons (2010), the critical antecedent
helps determine the differential causal effects of the independent variable across
cases when the critical juncture occurs due to an exogenous event.
Strengths of the Later Critical Junctures Concept
This later research has seen greater theorizing as to what constitutes a critical
juncture. As Howlett (2009) points out, there is an element of reactive sequencing
in our advanced understanding of critical junctures. Each of these approaches pos-
sess greater rigor than in the past, being conditional on circumstances whether
endogenous or exogenous (Schedler, 2007). These approaches offer a richer sense
of how earlier outcomes shape later ones than was the case with contingent punc-
tuations, or random starting points, and lock-in, associated with path dependency
models (Howlett, 2009). Path dependence may have overstated the degree of sta-
bility in political institutions during more “stable times” (Boas, 2007, p. 34). While
exogenous shocks still pay a role in critical junctures, a host of other factors are
now used to explain the concept, particularly agency, ideas, and discourse. As
Capoccia (2015) points out, these approaches yield fresh empirical findings and
enhance conversations on policy change.
Employing Old/New Frameworks for Identifying a Critical Juncture
“Traditionally, students of institutional change focused on the importance of
crisis” (Cortell & Peterson, 1999, p. 184). Consequently, “an important part of the
literature on critical junctures views them from the perspective of crises, placing
particular emphasis on the tensions leading up to the critical juncture” (Collier &
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Collier, 1991, p. 32). Wars, revolutions, coup d’etat, economic crises, changing bal-
ance of power, electoral landslides, demographic changes, and social movements
may produce an overwhelming mandate for policy and or/structural change
(Cortell & Peterson, 1999). This is because such unanticipated events can discredit
existing institutions and policies due to their association with, or inability to right,
the emergent situation, triggering change (Tilly, 1975). Figure 1 captures the early
understanding of critical junctures.
However, the later critical juncture’s literature recognizes that not all crises
lead to radical policy changes and critical junctures. A crisis can call into question
existing policies, bringing about the possibility of change (Haggard, 1988). Once a
crisis is identified, the failure of a policy impels policy-makers to look for a solu-
tion—stretching the extant policy paradigm (Blyth & Matthijs, 2017). This is possi-
ble as a policy paradigm must possess some malleability due to the regularly
changing political context (Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013). The failure of extant poli-
cies provides a window of opportunity for change agents to contest the viability
of the underlying paradigm (Kingdon, 1995).
Hall (1993, p. 291) argued that exogenous shocks, and policy failures, discredit
the old paradigm, leading to a reexamination of the belief systems through which
that policy was created. According to Legro (2000), extant ideational collapse and
new ideational consolidation are components of ideational change and the subse-
quent policy change process. Legro (2000) argues that if consensus is achieved, we
will see change agents in the form of policy entrepreneurs coordinating a replace-
ment set of ideas to the reigning consensus. The policy entrepreneurs will coalesce
around a new set of ideas championed by a political entrepreneur (Carstensen &
Schmidt, 2016; Hogan & Timoney, 2017). These new ideas, constituting a new
paradigm, function as a resource for policy-makers (Carstensen & Matthijs, 2018).
Political entrepreneurs exploit the uncertainty created by crises (what Blyth (2002)
terms as Knightian uncertainty), and “search for that mix of interests and appeals
that can produce a winning coalition” to generate major change (Sheingate, 2003,
p. 192). For new ideas to overthrow extant policies, the political entrepreneur
must occupy a position enabling them challenge existing arrangements with the
ideas generated by policy entrepreneurs. Political entrepreneurs act as a bridge
between coalitions of various types of policy entrepreneurs advocating new policy
ideas and the institutions implementing them (Hogan & Feeney, 2012). They sit at
the nexus of political power and policy ideas (Beland, Carstensen & Seabrooke,
2016). However, “failure to reach consensus on a replacement could still produce
Crisis 
(generative 
cleavage) 
Policy Change 
(significant, swift and 
encompassing)
= Critical 
juncture
1 2 CJ=
Figure 1. Early Critical Juncture Framework
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continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy” (Legro, 2000,
p. 424).
The nature of policy change is then examined in the context of the work of
Hall (1993). This examination also takes account of Hogan’s (2006) argument that
change must be significant, swift, and enduring, and equally Capoccia’s (2015)
argument that it should be short and followed by a longer period of stability
and adoption. This enables identification and differentiation of policy changes
ranging from adjustments, to the settings of policy instruments, to the total
transformation of policy goals as happened in the UK during the late 1970s,
with the shift from a Keynesian to a monetarist approach to economic policy-
making (Matthijs, 2012). This more nuanced understanding of critical junctures is
set out in Figure 2. This is a significantly more complex framework than set out
in Figure 1.
Evaluation and Discussion
Here, we will employ both of the above critical junctures frameworks. We will
look at the Mexican government’s changes to macroeconomic policy in 1982 to
show how these frameworks’ explain that change. When reading this section, the
early framework is only concerned with sections 1 and 2, while the later frame-
work is concerned with sections 1, 1.1, 1.2, and 2.
Mexican Macroeconomic Policy
Section 1: Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis. In the 1940s, Mexico adopted an
import substitution policy. At the same time, the private sector became tariff
dependent. Fiscal and monetary order collapsed under the Echeverria (1970–76)
administration—a time of falling agricultural exports, rapid population growth,
and middle-class disillusionment with single-party (Institutional Revolutionary
Party [PRI]) domination (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012). When Petroleos Mexicanos
Ideational Change
Crisis +
Extant 
ideational 
collapse
+ New ideational 
consolidation
3rd Order   
policy 
change
= Critical 
juncture
Crisis +
Extant 
ideational 
collapse
+
No new 
ideational 
consolidation
1st/2nd
Order 
policy 
change
= Extant policy 
continuity
1 1.1 1.2 2 = CJ
Figure 2. Later Critical Juncture Framework
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(PEMEX) discovered oil in the late 1970s, it only circumvented the dangers of
immediate crisis without resolving the structural problems (Nelson, 1990, p. 95).
Mexico was a net oil exporter, and pressure grew for it to expand public
spending. State ownership in enterprises quadrupled (Calderon-Madrid, 1997).
Under President Lopez Portillo (1976–1982), expenditure outstripped oil revenue
and an anemic taxation system, overheating the economy (Solıs, 1981). As a result,
Mexico had to borrow U.S. $78 billion (Alarcon & McKinley, 1992). The peso rose
in value as inflation rose, and the competiveness of exports, apart from oil, dimin-
ished (McCaughan, 1993).
Mexico was vulnerable when oil prices fell in the early 1980s. Compounding
matters, PEMEX and the Budget Committee declared oil revenues insufficient to
revive the economy (Ascher, 1999). Recession in the United States reduced
demand for Mexican goods, while an increase in interest rates reduced the money
supply and put pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing. U.S. banks had lent Mexico
$25 billion, and the servicing of these debts surpassed its oil revenues (Pastor &
Casta~neda, 1988). By 1982, as economic confidence waned, Mexicans began con-
verting pesos to dollars (Looney, 1985). The gravity of the situation came to inter-
national attention on August 13, 1982, when
The government fired the shot heard around the world, announcing that
it could not meet interest payments coming due within the next few days
and initiating negotiations for bridge loans and rescheduling agreements
with the U.S. Treasury, the IMF, and the private commercial banks.
(Nelson, 1990, p. 97)
Mexico’s economic indicators pointed toward crisis. Despite rapid economic
growth during the late 1970s, GDP contracted by 4.2% in 1983, and inflation
reached 58.92%. Output fell, real unemployment jumped toward 15%, and more
than 20 million people, half the workforce, were underemployed (Cornelius, 1985,
p. 92). The budget deficit stood at 16.5% of GDP. Compounding matters, U.S.
banks stopped lending to Mexican companies, as they already owed $600 million
in interest (Malkin, Greenwald & Earle, 1983).
In 1982, the peso was devaluated twice to increase exports. New short-term
loans were taken to counteract capital flight. Banco de Mexico’s reserves dried up
(Walker, 2013).
Section 1.1: Identification of collapse in ideas underlying macroeconomic
policy. Traditionally, PRI presidents operated populist-redistributive models
(Hellinger, 2013). In 1976, when Lopez Portillo became president, he was forced
to consider expenditure reductions due to the impact of the first oil crisis. But,
with the discovery of oil reserves, he adopted a patronage model that
incorporated expansive state expenditure with rapid industrialization (Bailey,
1980). Initially, this resulted in rapid growth, but as the economy grew reliant on
oil revenues, it became increasingly vulnerable.
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Despite oil revenues, Mexico became increasingly dependent on foreign bor-
rowing to meet its commitments. Once oil prices fell and interest rates rose, Mex-
ico faced the prospect of default. In response, in early 1982, the Lopez Portillo
administration introduced a plan to stabilize the economy. The ideas underlying
extant economic policy were coming under increasing strain. The international
discursive shift to “neoliberal” politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s is a signif-
icant factor, especially relevant given the proximity of Reagan’s United States. The
Reagan administration had inaugurated policy-based lending whereby govern-
ment agencies used debt relief as a lever to win market-orientated reforms from
developing countries (Kahler, 1990).
The economic crisis dominated the 1982 presidential election. The PRI nomi-
nated fiscal conservative Miguel de la Madrid as its candidate, the result of shifts
in a more conservative direction within the inner circles of the PRI (Sanderson,
1983). The choice marked a rupture from the party’s revolutionary ideology. With
the economy in crisis, and a sense that the PRI and traditional politics were failing
to meet the challenges confronting the country, free-market advocates demanded
a president who would support the rights of private property (Luna, Tirado &
Valdes, 1987). De la Madrid and his team’s belief in economics and the market
ensured that they were more receptive to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and U.S. Treasury advice (Domınguez & Castro, 2001). The ideas underpinning
extant economic policy, focused on import substitution industrialization and pro-
tectionism, had clearly collapsed.
Section 1.2: Identification of consolidation of new ideas for managing macroeconomic
policy. Throughout the campaign, which he ultimately won, de la Madrid
emphasized the differences between his proposed government and the outgoing
administration. In his inauguration address, he stressed that a new moral,
political, and economic approach was needed (Smith, 1990). He acknowledged
that Mexico was in an emergency. Locked into an IMF bailout negotiated by the
outgoing administration, de la Madrid presented a program for change (Golob,
2003).
The range of options open to the government was limited. External financing
had dried up in the aftermath of the economic crisis, and oil revenues remained
stagnant. Even when oil prices began to recover, PEMEX was not able to take
advantage. It was clear that, to maintain economic, political, and social order, a
break with the past was required. Acting as a political entrepreneur, de la Madrid
championed a new set of ideas on how to manage the economy. Change agents,
led by de la Madrid, consolidated around this replacement set of ideas. These
involved moving the economy away from import substitution and toward a more
open approach to international trade and investment.
Section 2: Identification of macroeconomic policy change. New president De la
Madrid appointed cabinet ministers from the conservative wing of the PRI who
supported his efforts to stabilize and open the economy, prioritizing the attraction
of FDI and focusing on high-tech industries (Philip, 2014). His first budget,
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aiming at reducing the deficit by 50%, was draconian, and the budgets he sent to
Congress in 1983 and 1984 represented a sustained austerity drive (Cornelius,
1985). The peso was pegged at a more “realistic” exchange rate, and plans were
introduced to restructure the bureaucracy. De la Madrid introduced conventional
monetary and fiscal austerity and more-extensive trade liberalization. The
Mexican government also adopted a less confrontational approach to the IMF and
was able to reach agreement on an adjustment program to revive the economy,
which allowed it avoid a debt moratorium (Looney, 1985).
Recognizing that Mexico could not rely on oil revenues, de la Madrid sought
to privatize public enterprises. There was an effort to combine structural change
and macroeconomic stabilization, with a focus on export-orientated industries
(Rodrik, 1992). Power was decentralized to the states to foster competition
between their governments and economies and thus help encourage the develop-
ment of private industries and investment. The overall objective was integration
of the Mexican economy into the global economy.
These policies were to have a long-lasting effect on Mexico’s economic and
social development. The shift to neoliberalism—marked by privatization and
deregulation—was radical (Pastor & Wise, 1997). Relaxation of restrictive FDI
laws was a clear signal of the government’s desire to attract foreign industries
(Lustig, 1992) and allowed Mexican businesses to forge relationships with foreign
firms. All of the reforms enabled Mexico to reach its IMF targets for reducing the
public sector deficit.
There was a transformation in the relationship between the state and private
sector (Schamis, 2002). As private-sector development became crucial to economic
revival, its growing importance gave it more influence over the formulation of eco-
nomic policy and increased access to the government. Mexican economic history
can be divided into pre- and post-1982. The crisis saw the development of a new
set of economic policies and a new approach to economic management. In the wake
of the crisis, Mexico experienced a paradigm shift in macroeconomic policy which
constituted a critical juncture (see Hall, 1993). The market, private ownership, and
competition were to possess an increasingly important role over the coming years
as state control, public ownership, and protectionism were no longer prioritized
(Pastor & Wise, 1997). Beginning in 1982, Mexican economic policy started down a
different path, culminating in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
in 1994.
This example highlights that the earlier critical junctures framework was cap-
able of providing only a restricted understanding of radical change, in this case
macroeconomic policy change (sections 1 and 2). It shows, as pointed out by
Matthijs (2012), the importance of the ideational change element (sections 1.1 and
1.2) in the critical juncture framework’s capacity for explaining the policy change
process. It is the politics of ideas that ultimately determines the outcome of a critical
juncture (Capoccia, 2015). Without incorporating an ideational change element in
the critical junctures framework, we would be left with a stunted understanding
of what happened in Mexico in 1982.
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Conclusion
The critical junctures literature has, over the years, taken a deeper analytical
turn. The earlier punctuated equilibrium understanding of critical junctures,
dependent upon the acceptance of institutional stability and the importance of
exogenous shocks, contingency, thick description, randomness, and self-reinforcing
sequences in the context of historical institutionalism has given way to better under-
standing derived from a deeper appreciation of the nature of change. Since the turn
of the century the critical junctures concept has increasingly sought to explain the
patterns present during times of change, and carries a greater appreciate of tempo-
rality, choice, reactive sequencing, agency, agents’ interests, discourse and the role
of ideas in how change occurs.
Seeing how endogenous factors promote change provides for a more complex
understanding of critical junctures in public policy as we saw in the case of Mex-
ico in 1982. The newer critical junctures frameworks are sensitive to identifying
when policy change does not constitute a critical juncture and can classify the nat-
ure of that change. This understanding of the critical junctures concept empha-
sizes the importance of agency in the context of contingency, and interests, ideas,
and discourse in the policy change process. In this context, policy change is
defined by the ideas of agents and the communication among them (Peters, 2012).
From this, we can see not only what the consequences are when critical junc-
tures occur, but also what changes come in their wake when they fail to occur
(Matthijs, 2012). Moving away from path dependence has advantages considering
how unsystematically it has been applied (Howlett, 2009). “The conceptual appa-
ratus of path dependence may not always offer a realistic image of institutional
development” particularly given its bias toward stability (Capoccia, 2015, p. 43).
Alternatively, the discursive institutionalist approach endogenizes change,
explaining how agents bring about change through their preferences and actions
(Schmidt, 2010). In this context, discursive institutionalism enables the construc-
tion of meaning by agents whose ideational capacities explain how they create
policies while communicating about those polices to preserve or to alter them
(Blyth, 2002; Matthijs, 2012; Schmidt, 2008, 2010). Thus, path dependence applies
only to a limited number of policy events—exogenous shocks leading to critical
junctures, whereas endogenous sources of change are much more common and
can lead to a range of policy alterations including critical junctures.
John Hogan is a research fellow in the College of Business at the Technological
University Dublin. He has published widely in comparative public policy and glo-
bal lobbying regulations.
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